Transboundary water governance has received special attention in the wake of the World Bank vice-president Ismail Serageldin's famous prediction in 1995 that, "if the wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over water".
Introduction
Two hundred and sixty one of the world's river basins are shared by more than one commons of the oceans, the atmosphere, Antarctica or biodiversity, transboundary rivers involve management by a set number of states within their particular political relations. Like the global commons, however, managing water across and within borders as a common good raises some key issues of scale. In particular, questions arise when the development framework set in place by transnational institutions has implications for more local commons management of the same resource.
In their critique of the Brundtland Commission's "Our Common Future", The Ecologist turned the issue into a question of "Whose Common Future?". 2 The main area of concern here is the construction of a global commons that arrogates wisdom and management of these commons to global institutions such as the World Bank. In so doing, biodiversity and other resources deemed to have world heritage value are deemed too important for local management. The use of neo-liberal property rights regimes and market mechanisms to deal with perceived local "tragedies of the commons" 3 sees development predicated on enclosure, as critiqued in a number of publications by the radical environmental and social justice think-tank Cornerhouse, and this critique can be extended to mainstream environmental governance as enclosure.
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In this presentation, I examine parallel issues in what might be termed a "bioregional transboundary commons", in the sense that the Mekong River Basin is a transnational area defined by a natural boundary within which the commonality of the shared resource is based on the interconnected nature of the river system. I start with an overall account and history of the framework for managing the Mekong as a shared resource, and then consider how development options associated with this framework pose questions for more localised commons, their tenure and their management. This is illustrated through case studies in water governance, water infrastructure and commodification of water. 
Transnational commons in water and their management: the Mekong
Transboundary management of rivers whose waters and catchments are shared by several countries is clearly an important concern. This concern was expressed dramatically in 1995, when the then World Bank Vice-President stated famously that, "if the wars of this century were fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over water". 5 Since that time, there has been much critique of such an analysis, in part because it is seen to be alarmist, in part because shared rivers have in fact often served as a basis for cooperation rather than conflict, 6 and in part because the primary dimensions and scale of conflict over water are more locally and socially than geopolitically constructed.
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The Mekong River and the territory in its Basin is shared by six countries: China, 
Water governance
Water governance has become an important part of water reforms and of development assistance in the water sector. In many respects, this is a widely welcomed move away from old-style "hardware" financing dominated by engineering projects, toward the "software" of seeking equitable, efficient and sustainable approaches to water management. High on the agenda of water governance in its river basin context is the establishment of river basin organisations. Ironically, however, river basin organisations can both enhance and undermine governance for the common good, depending on how they deal with commonality of interest in freshwater at various scales. Bureaucratisation of process is one threat to managing the local commons in water. Issues of representation present another. In the Mekong, these can be illustrated through governance at the level of the MRC, and through the river basin committees being established in Thailand and mooted elsewhere.
As an intergovernmental organisation, the MRC is in principle owned and governed by its member countries (the four lower Mekong nations of Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam). In fact, as an organisation whose budget is almost entirely dependent on foreign grant aid, the MRC remains aid donor-driven. The nature of governmental control through the Ministerial Council and Joint Committee is such that two major barriers exist to representation of the local commons in water and fish. First, it is Water Resources departments and related ministries who represent "national interests" on the MRC Council, lending a strong bias toward construction and "developing" the river. 
Water infrastructure
The greatest physical threat to common property values of water at a livelihood level is the further construction of large scale infrastructure. Since its establishment in 1995, MRC has certainly moved away from a dam-first mentality toward river basin development, and indeed the largest donor funding has gone into the fisheries and environment programs. More recently, there has been a return to an investment-led notion of sustainable river basin development, with the current CEO of the Secretariat seeing the role of the Commission as an "investment facilitator" -albeit "with due principle, supposed to be taken care of by better planning, resettlement and compensation programs. Nevertheless, the fact remains that this project, which will be the largest transboundary energy project in Asia (almost all the electricity generated is for sale to Thailand) and requires an investment roughly equivalent to the annual GDP of the country in which it is being built, involves a loss of public resources managed in common by affected communities and changes in how they will be managed. These include not only the sections of the Nam Theun River, forests and farmlands of 6000 people from ethnic minority groups that will go under the 450 sq km reservoir, but also the downstream fisheries on the Xe Bang Fai River, accessed by up to 100,000 people and river bank gardens along the same river. The proposed compensation for loss of these common resources is an unspecified "replacement" of lost fisheries through aquaculture ponds. Another loss of local commons will be in the use of upstream forest lands in the headwaters area by remote indigenous minorities whose livelihood activities will be circumscribed in the name of protecting both biodiversity (a global common) and the investment in the reservoir in the form of "ecosystem services".
A second major infrastructure project shortly to get underway is the Thai Water Grid 
Water as commodity
There is a fundamental tension between water as a common resource and water as commodity. This has been debated since the signing of the 1992 Dublin Principles that established an international understanding of the economic nature of water. Water has been established as commodity, albeit in a highly contested manner, as part of the mainstream development thrust in the Mekong region. Two dimensions of water as commodity stand out in particular. financial crisis (which, ironically, the ASPL was designed to alleviate). In fact, the notion of water as a free good is something of a myth -villagers have long paid for water by mobilizing labour, materials and "social capital" in local irrigation systems and have paid for the use of water through rice or cash payments to locally elected irrigation managers in muang-faai systems. Elsewhere, locally managed pump irrigation attracts a fee that farmers have willingly paid and managed in common. Thus, the issue of pricing per se is subsidiary to the imposition of new centrally imposed charges, and in particular to the question of alienable water rights.
A second dimension of water as commodity is the valorizing of rivers inherent in large dam projects, particularly as the private sector now makes the running on projects such as Nam Theun 2 as described above. Ironically, part of the discourse of Nam Theun 2 "consultation teams" involved in the public relations work to bring affected communities on-side was to talk of "rivers of gold and silver" 13 that would bring untold wealth to the country and its citizens alike once projects like Nam Theun 2 get off the ground. Here, the national "common good" evoked through the "national interest" takes precedence over and usurps the local commons.
Conclusion
Transboundary rivers such as the Mekong are, and need to be, managed in common.
However, without a scale sensitivity to what commonality of interest and the commons themselves mean and imply, there is a tendency for the transnational (i.e. broad-scale)
commons to dominate and become tied closely to a mainstream developmentalism. In this presentation, I have tried to demonstrate some of the dilemmas this creates for the local commons associated with water in its river basin context.
There is nothing to suggest that concern for transboundary commons is incompatible with an understanding of, and respect for, the commons at other scales. Rather, the status quo, particularly as manifested in the governance structures associated with large scale and bureaucratically and developmentally inclined river basin institutions, mitigates against simultaneous multi-scale understandings of water as a shared and jointly managed resource. Progressive moves toward a scaled approach to governance
